

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 02-773C
(Filed August 9, 2005)

*
CHARLES D. YOUNG and *
ANGELA R. YOUNG, *
 *
Plaintiffs, *
 *
v. *
 *
THE UNITED STATES, *
 *
Defendant. *
 *

ORDER

On August 2, 2005, plaintiff Mr. Charles Young filed a document he entitled “Motion for Court Assistance and Intervention Pending Final Disposition of this Case.” Mot. at 1. The plaintiff and his former wife have a case pending before the Court regarding an alleged contract dispute with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. Mister Young is proceeding pro se, and the Court interprets his motion as one made under Rule 19 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims, for “Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication.”

In his motion, the plaintiff explains that his former wife and co-plaintiff was “[c]oerced, [b]row [b]eaten, or otherwise [h]arrassed [sic]” by Ocwen Federal Bank into “[s]urrendering the [p]roperty in [q]uestion,” which Mr. Young claims “undermines this [v]ery [p]roceeding [against the United States].” Mot. at 2-3. Accordingly, Mr. Young “asks this Court . . . to contact Ocwen Bank and [s]uspend all of their [a]ctions until this case is [f]ully [d]ecided.” Mot. at 3. In addition, Mr. Young attached an order from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denying a motion for reconsideration. The Youngs had previously sued Ocwen Federal Bank in that forum, and had their case dismissed after a bench trial. *See Young v. United States*, 60 Fed. Cl. 418, 422 (2004).

Congress sets the metes and bounds for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The principal source of that jurisdiction is the Tucker Act, which provides in relevant part:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000). This Court does not have jurisdiction over claims against private parties, *see Ambase Corp. v. United States*, 61 Fed. Cl. 794, 796 (2004), or claims seeking review of district court judgments. *See Allustiarte v. United States*, 256 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Moreover, it bears stressing that this Court is a forum in which parties who have contracted with the government may seek money damages for breaches of contracts by the government. The remedy available to the Youngs is money damages for the breach, not injunctive relief concerning the independent actions of private third parties.

The Court is not unmindful of the plaintiffs' *pro se* status. But as our Court has previously noted, "[a]lthough plaintiff is accorded leniency in presenting his case, his *pro se* status does not render him immune from the requirement that he plead facts upon which a valid claim can rest." *Paalan v. United States*, 57 Fed. Cl. 15, 16 (2003). There is no valid ground to support Mister Young's motion. The Court does not have jurisdiction over claims against Ocwen Federal Bank, and thus Mr. Young's motion is **DENIED**.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

VICTOR J. WOLSKI
Judge